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July 2008 1 Introduction
The European central bank (ECB) is usually considered to be less transparent
than other major central banks in advanced economies such as the Federal
Reserve in the US or the Bank of England (Blinder et al. 2001; Dincer and
Eichengreen 2007). The ECB is widely criticized for this, and most of the
literature argues that more transparency is better than less because it allows
the private sector to make better informed decisions. In particular, it is
argued that preferences and goals should be communicated clearly (Blinder
1998).
More recently, however, there are also approaches in the literature which
argue that less than maximum transparency is desirable. In particular, it is
argued that creative ambiguity (Cukierman and Meltzer 1986) can discipline
the private sector, such as wage setters, and induce governments to pursue
more employment friendly policies. This paper contributes to this debate
and considers the in￿ uence of central bank transparency on ￿scal policies in
an asymmetric monetary union.1
In developing our arguments, we complement earlier studies in two dif-
ferent strands of literature. First and most obviously, our paper is related to
the huge literature on the in￿ uence of monetary policy uncertainty (Brainard
1967; S￿derstr￿m 2002). Most of those papers show that monetary policy
becomes less aggressive if there is uncertainty about its impact, such as is
the case with uncertainty about the transmission of monetary policy (Gros
and Hefeker 2002; Benigno 2004). This literature has more recently taken a
di⁄erent approach by introducing the response of domestic agents to uncer-
tainty about the central bank￿ s reaction function.2 Sorensen (1991), Gr￿ner
(2002) and Gr￿ner et al. (2005), for instance, demonstrate that uncertainty
on monetary policy may discipline wage setters.
A player that has received relatively little attention here is the ￿scal au-
thority. Only a few contributions have so far combined the issue of central
bank transparency with ￿scal policymaking. Hughes Hallett and Viegi (2003)
model a monetary-￿scal policy game to investigate the e⁄ects of transpar-
ency, depending on whether it corresponds to political transparency (where
the central bank￿ s preferences are clearly de￿ned) or economic transparency
(where the central bank￿ s targets are made clear). Ciccarone et al. (2007)
develop a model of a unionised economy with supply-side ￿scal policy and
consider the in￿ uence of central bank transparency on strategic wage setting.
However, none of these papers has explicitly examined how ￿scal authorities
react to transparency. Our contribution aims to ￿ll this void and to show
how this reaction is transformed in a monetary union.
1The concept of transparency used here refers to "preference uncertainty". For a recent
discussion, see Hughes Hallett and Libich (2006) and Geraats (2002).
2This literature is however much too broad to be completely referenced here. See, for
instance, Eij¢ nger and Hoeberichts (2000), Winkler (2000) Geraats (2002) and Eij¢ nger
and van der Cruijsen (2007) for surveys.
2In this way, our paper can also be linked to the broad discussion about
monetary and ￿scal interactions in a monetary union. This literature however
is too broad and diverse to be adequately referenced here, but includes im-
portant contributions as for instance, Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998, 1999),
Beetsma and Uhlig (1999), Dixit and Lambertini (2001, 2003) and Uhlig
(2003) von Hagen and Wyplosz (2008). In this paper, we make use of the
framework developed by Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998) to o⁄er some insights
as to how the enlargement of a monetary union may a⁄ect tax decisions and
economic outcomes in the member countries. Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998)
showed that the formation or the enlargement of a monetary union can dis-
cipline national ￿scal policymakers and thereby reduce taxes, in￿ ation and
the public spending bias.3 This result is due to the fact that the strategic
position of each individual ￿scal player vis-￿-vis the common central bank is
weakened in a monetary union.
Our paper develops Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998)￿ s analysis in two fur-
ther ways. First, it assumes that the reaction of monetary policy to taxation
is to some degree uncertain. The issue of uncertainty is particularly relevant
when examining the repercussions of the enlargement of a monetary union.
As pointed out by Goldberg and Klein (2005) or Hefeker (2008) such a change
in the monetary regime is likely to create some additional uncertainty in the
participating countries. The decisions of a larger central bank re￿ ect all kinds
of preferences and interactions among the di⁄erent member countries and are
thereby less predictable.
Second, our paper also considers cross-country asymmetries among the
old and new members. Indeed, the enlargement will also imply that the de-
gree of heterogeneity among member countries increases. This may have an
e⁄ect on the common monetary policy and it may feedback on the optimal
￿scal policies in the member states. Three possible asymmetries are focused
upon: 1) di⁄erences in the political and economic weights of the countries; 2)
di⁄erences in their degree of monetary uncertainty; 3) di⁄erences in the gov-
ernments￿spending targets. These asymmetries could re￿ ect the extension
of EMU to middle and eastern European countries.4 In particular, the gov-
ernments￿spending targets di⁄er widely among old and new member states
in the EU, implying di⁄erent tax burdens on the population and thus on the
output levels in Europe. Consequently, by integrating monetary uncertainty
and cross-country asymmetries, we qualify Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998)￿ s
result and demonstrate that the tax-decreasing e⁄ect of the monetary union
(enlargement) does not necessarily hold any longer.
Our principal results can be summarised as follows. We ￿rst show that
monetary uncertainty disciplines ￿scal policymakers and thereby reduces
taxes, average in￿ ation and output distortions. Thus, maximum transpar-
3The creation and the extension of a MU a⁄ect economic outcomes through similar
mechanisms.
4Depending on the type of asymmetry, a more relevant example could also be a mon-
etary union between continental Europe, such as Germany and France, and the UK.
3ency need not be optimal from this point of view. However, as more members
enter the monetary union, the ￿scal disciplining e⁄ect of uncertainty is mit-
igated. As a consequence, monetary union enlargement may lead to a more
aggressive ￿scal stance in some member countries, depending on their rel-
ative economic and political weights, on the governments￿spending target,
and on the change in the degree of uncertainty that the particular country
experiences with the enlargement. Our conclusion is that deliberate uncer-
tainty can help to reduce distortions arising from ￿scal policy so that lower
central bank transparency could be an optimal response to monetary union
enlargement. This solution, however, should be used cautiously as it could
prove to be counterproductive for countries characterized by a high public
spending target.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section analyzes the e⁄ects
on uncertainty on ￿scal decisions in a closed economy. Section 3 extends this
analysis to a monetary union and derives the e⁄ects of the its enlargement on
macroeconomic outcomes. Two cases are considered: The benchmark case
of a symmetric monetary union and the more complex case of a monetary
union with heterogenous countries. Section 4 concludes.
2 Policy choices in the closed economy
This section presents a model in line with Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998)
extended to allow for imperfect political transparency of the central bank as
in Demertzis and Hughes Hallett (2007).5
2.1 The model
We begin by considering a closed economy (indexed by i) consisting of three
players: the central bank, the government and the private sector. The timing
of the game is as follows: (i) the private sector sets its expectations, (ii)
the government sets the rate of taxation, (iii) the central bank determines
in￿ ation, and (iv) output is realized.
Since in practice monetary policy can be adjusted more quickly than the
￿scal decisions, we assume that the government is a Stackelberg leader vis-
￿-vis the central bank. Thus, when setting taxes, the government takes the
expected reaction of the central bank into account. The private sector, how-
ever, is not coordinated and thus not able to internalize the policymakers￿
reaction. This re￿ ects the fact that the atomistic private sector takes policy
5Demertzis and Hughes Hallett (2007) distinguish imperfect political transparency from
imperfect economic transparency. The former relates to the misunderstandings about the
central bank￿ s preference parameters whereas the latter is due to the misperceptions about
its targets. A similar distinction is made in Hughes Hallett and Viegi (2003) and Geraats
(2002).
4decisions as given and adjusts its behaviour only gradually because, for in-
stance, wage contracts are ￿xed for a certain time period.6 We therefore
assume that the private sector plays Nash against the central bank and the
￿scal authority. The model is solved by backward induction.
Output xi is increasing in surprise in￿ ation ￿i ￿￿e
i and decreasing in the
tax rate ￿i.
xi = ￿i ￿ ￿
e
i ￿ ￿i (1)
The government aims to minimise a loss function de￿ned over in￿ ation,





i + ￿ (gi ￿ ~ gi)
2 (2)
where ￿ and ￿ respectively measure the government￿ s relative dislike of in-
￿ ation and deviations of public expenditure from a target level.7 The ￿rst
two aims are standard in the literature, while the third aim should re￿ ect
the optimal size of the public sector in the economy. This could either be
due to di⁄erent societal preferences over the size of the welfare state or due
to political economic considerations of the government that aims to boost
public investment to increase reelection chances (Drazen and Brender 2005).
In setting the public expenditures level, the government faces a balanced
budget constraint:
gi = ￿i (3)
We, hence, do not focus on debts and de￿cits, as in Beetsma and Boven-
berg (1997, 1999) for instance, and we also rule out that seignoriage contrib-
utes to ￿nancing the budget. Our model is thus in spirit of a long-run model
with a balanced budget requirement.
In specifying the central bank￿ s loss function, we draw on Ciccarone et
al. (2007):
LCB;i = (I ￿ ￿)￿
2
i + (1 + ￿)x
2
i (4)
where I measures the central bank￿ s degree of conservatism; ￿ is a random
variable with ￿ 2 [￿1;I], E(￿) = 0 and E(￿2) = ￿2
￿. The issue of monetary
uncertainty arises as the central bank is not fully transparent in terms of
its preferences. Although the government and the private sector are on av-
erage able to predict these preferences, there is some degree of uncertainty.
The implications of this uncertainty for equilibrium can be determined by
considering the consequences of the variance of ￿2
￿, which we interpret as
the degree of monetary uncertainty.8 Di⁄erent central banks could thus be
6Cukierman and Lippi (1999) show that an atomistic private sector does not internalize
the central bank￿ s reaction to its behavior.
7Note that the parameters ￿ and ￿ are not indexed by i. Thus, we assume that the
governments￿relative dislike of in￿ ation and public spending deviations are identical across
countries. Allowing di⁄erent spending targets su¢ ces to derive asymmetric policy choices.
8Note that ￿2
￿ 2 [0;I] as the random variable ￿ is de￿ned in a compact set and has
an expected value equal to zero. See the Appendix of Ciccarone et al. (2007) for further
details.
5distinguished by how high they score on a transparency index (for a recent
study, see Dincer and Eichengreen (2007)).
The solution of the central bank￿ s problem is derived from Eqs. (1) and






i + ￿i) (5)
In￿ ation is increasing in expected in￿ ation and taxation because the cent-
ral bank aims to compensate their negative e⁄ect on output. It is also in-
creasing in the stochastic weight for output ￿ but decreasing in the central
bank￿ s aversion to in￿ ation.
The government determines its ￿scal decisions by minimising E(LG;i)
subject to the budget constraint (3) and the central bank￿ s reaction function
(5). This yields the following tax rate :
￿i =
~ gi I (1 + I)￿
￿(1 + ￿2
￿) + ￿2
￿ + I2 + I (1 + I)￿
(6)
Clearly, taxation is increasing in the spending target and falling in prefer-
ence uncertainty. The latter leads to lower taxation because the government
cannot rely on the central bank￿ s reaction to distortionary taxes and thus
acts more cautiously. The in￿ uence of central bank in￿ ation aversion on
taxes is ambiguous but likely to be positive if uncertainty is large.9
Finally, the equilibrium values for in￿ ation, output and public expendit-
ure deviations are respectively given by:
￿i =
~ gi (1 + I)￿
￿(1 + ￿2
￿) + ￿2
￿ + I2 + I (1 + I)￿
(1 + ￿) (7)
xi =
￿~ gi (1 + I)￿
￿(1 + ￿2
￿) + ￿2
￿ + I2 + I (1 + I)￿
(I ￿ ￿) (8)
gi ￿ ~ gi =





￿ + I2 + I (1 + I)￿
(9)
As can be seen from Eqs. (6) through (9), the higher is the targeted level
of public expenditure ~ gi, the higher is the need to use distortionary taxation
and the further away are in￿ ation, output and public expenditures from their
respective targets.
2.2 The e⁄ects of monetary uncertainty
This section examines the e⁄ects of uncertainty about central bank prefer-
ences on the average level and the variability of economic outcomes. These
e⁄ects are summarised in the following result.











6Result 1. Monetary uncertainty reduces taxes, average in￿ation and output
distortions but increases deviations of public expenditures from their target
level.
Proof. Taxes and average in￿ ation decline in ￿2
￿ as can be seen respectively
from Eqs. (6) and (7) while, according to (8), average output increases with
￿2
￿.
Concerning the impact of uncertainty on public expenditure deviations,
we obtain:




￿~ gi I(1 + I)(1 + ￿)￿
f￿(1 + ￿2
￿) + ￿2
￿ + I2 + I (1 + I)￿g
2 < 0
Result 1 can be explained by Brainard￿ s (1967) principle of policy cau-
tion. Monetary uncertainty ampli￿es the (perceived) marginal costs associ-
ated with higher taxes and thereby induces the government to adopt a less
aggressive ￿scal policy. This in turn brings about lower output distortions
and lower average in￿ ation. However, as taxes decrease, so does the public
expenditure level, thus bringing the government further away from its desired
level of spending.
Result 2. In￿ation and output variability decrease with monetary uncer-
tainty if the latter is su¢ ciently high.
Proof. Using ￿2
￿i = E[￿i ￿ E (￿i)]2 and ￿2





















2 [￿ ￿ ￿2
￿ (1 + ￿) + I2 + I(1 + I)￿]
f￿(1 + ￿2
￿) + ￿2
￿ + I2 + I (1 + I)￿g
2




￿ + I [I + ￿(1 + I)]
1 + ￿
(10)
Hence, more uncertainty about central bank preferences does not neces-
sarily translate into more in￿ ation variability. This result is in the line with
the ￿ndings of Gr￿ner (2002) and Gr￿ner et al. (2005).10 Indeed, less trans-
parency triggers two opposing e⁄ects on macroeconomic volatility. On one
hand, it directly increases in￿ ation and output variability as it generates more
uncertainty in the economy. On the other hand, as shown in the previous
result, opacity leads to greater ￿scal discipline and in this way contributes
to reduced in￿ ation and output variability. We refer to this latter e⁄ect as
the ￿ disciplining e⁄ect￿ . Its importance depends, in particular, on the degree
10In fact, Gr￿ner (2002) and Gr￿ner et al. (2005) obtain this result in a framework with
strategic interactions between the central bank and non-atomistic wage setters.
7of monetary uncertainty ￿2
￿. Therefore, when ￿2
￿ is high, this ￿ disciplining
e⁄ect￿may dominate the other e⁄ect so that the overall impact of central
bank opacity on macroeconomic variability eventually becomes negative.






@I > 0. Hence, the lower is the central bank￿ s aversion to in￿ ation
I, the more uncertainty is likely to reduce macroeconomic variability. This
happens since a lower I ampli￿es monetary policy uncertainty and thereby
strengthens the ￿ disciplining e⁄ect￿on ￿scal policy.
Besides, we also observe that:
@f
@￿ > 0. Whenever the government is less
concerned about the public expenditure deviations, it is more prone to re-
duce taxes in response to greater uncertainty. This means that a lower ￿
is associated with a stronger ￿ disciplining e⁄ect￿and therefore with greater
probability that monetary uncertainty reduces in￿ ation and output variabil-
ity.
3 Policy choices in the larger monetary union
Having studied the interactions between monetary uncertainty and ￿scal
policy in a single economy, we now shift our attention to these interactions
in a monetary union (MU) composed of two countries. We represent the
current members of the MU by country 1 and the new entering members by
country 2. We allow for cross-country di⁄erences in the targeted level of pub-
lic expenditures. More precisely, we assume that the government in country
2 targets a higher public expenditure level than the government in country
1, so that: e g2 > e g1. This could re￿ ect a larger need for public investment,
a preference for a larger welfare state, or simply the government￿ s interest
for higher expenditures for political economic reasons, such as increasing
reelection chances.
With the MU extension (superscript U), the monetary policy is now cent-
ralised in the hands of a larger central bank (CCB) which sets the common
in￿ ation rate ￿U prevailing in both countries.11 We assume that the CCB￿ s
policy results from the interaction of both countries￿ monetary decision-
makers, so that the relative weights on in￿ ation and output of the common
central bank is a weighted average of national monetary authorities￿prefer-
ences. The common central bank is assumed to target common in￿ ation and













where s1 + s2 = 1, si (8i = 1;2) measuring the member countries￿relative
economic weight; ￿U is a random variable with ￿U 2 [￿1;I], E(￿U) = 0 and
E(￿U)2 = ￿2
￿U.
11We assume that the goods market of both countries are perfectly integrated. Therefore
enlargement implies a common rate of in￿ ation in both countries.
8MU extension means that new members are added to the union whose
preferences are uncertain as well. As a consequence, even if on average new
members have similar preferences to older members(I2 = I1 = I), the uncer-
tainty a⁄ecting their preferences can di⁄er. Hence, we assume that the degree
of uncertainty in the enlarged monetary union corresponds to a weighted av-
erage of the uncertainty in the individual member countries. It is de￿ned by:
￿2
￿U ￿ E(￿U)2 = z1￿2
1 + z2￿2
2, where ￿2
i measures the preference uncertainty
in country i (8i = 1;2) and zi its relative political weight (z1 + z2 = 1).12







U;e + ￿ ￿
￿
(12)
where ￿ ￿ = s1￿1 + s2￿2 is the average tax rate in the extended union.
The government in country i (i = 1;2) chooses the tax rate to minimise
its expected losses E(LG;i) (with LG;i de￿ned in Eq.(2)) subject to (3) and
(12), taking the other government￿ s ￿scal decision as given. The tax rate set



























where index j refers to country i￿ s new partner in the MU;










j + I￿j > 0.
We see that tax rates are increasing in the domestic spending target but
falling in that of the other country so that tax rates are strategic substitutes
between countries. This is because higher taxes abroad increase common
in￿ ation, which forces the domestic government to lower domestic taxation
in order to lower in￿ ationary pressure on the common central bank. The
implications of ￿scal-monetary interactions in a MU with uncertainty are
not obvious. We therefore have to start from the simple benchmark case
where all countries have identical parameters. We then proceed to the more
complex case of asymmetric countries.
3.1 The symmetric case
We ￿rst consider the simple case of symmetric countries, that is the case
where both countries are identical in their public spending target, in their
economic and political weight and in their degree of monetary uncertainty. In




￿U. This latter equality implies that the member countries do not
experience any additional monetary uncertainty with the MU enlargement.
12The random variables ￿1 and ￿2, characterized by E(￿1) = E(￿2) = 0 and E(￿1)2 = ￿2
1
and E(￿2)2 = ￿2
2, are assumed to be independently distributed.
9Substituting these parameter values into (13) yields the equilibrium tax
rate in the symmetric case (￿1 = ￿2 = ￿):
￿
U =







￿U + I [2(1 + I)(1 + ￿) ￿ 1]
(14)
With this expression, we can show how the impact of uncertainty on tax
decisions is modi￿ed by the MU enlargement. By comparing equations (6)
and (14), we obtain the following result.
Result 3. The disciplining e⁄ect of uncertainty on taxes may be weakened
in the enlarged MU.
Proof. Di⁄erentiating the equilibrium tax rates observed in the closed eco-








￿~ g I (1 + I)￿ (1 + ￿)
[￿(1 + ￿2
￿) + ￿2
￿ + I2 + I (1 + I)￿]













￿U + I [2(1 + I)(1 + ￿) ￿ 1]
￿2 < 0 (16)
For an initial degree of uncertainty, ￿ ￿2
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This condition holds for a su¢ ciently high degree of central bank conser-
vatism, I.
The intuition for this result is simple. As in the enlarged MU the gov-
ernments internalise the central bank￿ s reaction to their ￿scal decisions to
a lesser extent, the disciplining e⁄ect of monetary uncertainty has a lower
impact on taxes. Thus, the bene￿cial e⁄ect of uncertainty on tax policy is
reduced under a common monetary authority.
This result allows us to brie￿ y touch on the issue of optimal degree of
preference uncertainty, even though this normative issue is beyond the scope
of our paper. When choosing its degree of transparency, the central bank
faces a trade-o⁄ between the macroeconomic volatility and the ￿scal discip-
lining e⁄ect generated by monetary uncertainty. Since the MU enlargement
mitigates the latter e⁄ect, it renders uncertainty less e¢ cient in improving
economic performances on average. As a consequence, the central bank may
be induced to be more transparent so as to attenuate macroeconomic in-
stability.
10Now that we have determined the economic outcomes in the enlarged
monetary union, we can compare them with those observed in the closed
economy and derive the e⁄ects of the MU enlargement. These e⁄ects are
directly related to result 3.
Formally, to study the impact of the MU enlargement on macroeconomic
performances, we ￿rst determine its impact on taxes. This is done by consid-
ering the di⁄erence (￿U
i ￿ ￿i); 8i = 1;2. Once this di⁄erence is known, it is
straightforward to derive the e⁄ects of the MU enlargement on the member
countries￿average levels of output, in￿ ation and on their public expenditures.
By comparing expression (14) with the equilibrium tax rate observed be-
fore the MU enlargement (6), we obtain the following results.
Result 4. Under the assumption of symmetric countries, the MU enlarge-
ment increases taxes, average in￿ation, output distortions and public ex-
penditures when uncertainty is high.
Proof. The comparison of Eq. (6) with Eq. (14) reveals that the MU
enlargement has a positive impact on taxes and thus on average in￿ ation,
output distortions and public expenditures ￿as they are positively related







This result extends that obtained by Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998),
who emphazised a tax-decreasing e⁄ect of (the enlargement of) the monet-
ary union. In our model this occurs for su¢ ciently low values of monetary
uncertainty, ￿2
￿U, but a positive impact of the monetary union enlargement
on taxes arises when the central bank￿ s opacity about its preferences (￿2
￿U)
is high.13
To understand the intuition underlying result 4 we must note that the
overall impact of the monetary union enlargement on ￿scal policies (and
thereby on economic outcomes) is the consequence of two opposite mech-
anisms. The ￿rst has already been highlighted by Beetsma and Bovenberg
(1998). It hinges on the fact that with the monetary union enlargement, the
governments￿￿scal choices have a smaller impact on monetary policy. More
precisely, in the enlarged monetary union, tax increases result in lower aver-
age in￿ ation.14 Therefore, they are more costly in terms of reduced output,
inducing governments to adopt a less aggressive ￿scal stance. Hence, through
this channel the monetary union enlargement is associated with a diminution
in average in￿ ation, output distortions and public expenditures.
13Note that since the MU extension does not create any additional monetary uncertainty
in the participating countries (￿2
i = ￿2
￿U, 8i = 1;2), higher in￿ ation and output variability
observed in the enlarged MU can only be due to an increase in taxation.
14Indeed, from Eqs. (5) and (12) we observe that @￿
U
@￿i < @￿i
@￿i; 8i = 1;2.
11However, in taking into account the fact that the central bank may not
be fully transparent, our analysis uncovers a new channel through which the
monetary union extension leads to less disciplined ￿scal policies. In the larger
monetary union, governments internalise the monetary uncertainty created
by their tax increases in a lesser extent. Thereby, as demonstrated in the
result 3, the monetary union extension mitigates the ￿ disciplining e⁄ect￿that
uncertainty has on ￿scal decisions and hence encourages higher taxation. The
strength of this mechanism is calibrated by the degree of monetary uncer-
tainty, ￿2
￿. In particular, when ￿2
￿U is high, this mechanism may dominate the
one highlighted by Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998). In this case, the monet-
ary union extension ￿nally results in an increase in taxes, average in￿ ation,
output distortions and public expenditures.
If we take the analysis one step further, result 4 also suggests that ￿scal
coordination may become desirable in a monetary union with relatively low
central bank transparency. Indeed, with symmetric countries ￿scal coordin-
ation yields the same policy outcomes as under the case of a closed economy.
It would thus allow to recover ￿scal discipline.
From condition (17), we can also easily derive the following result.
Result 5. The lower the central bank￿ s aversion to in￿ation, I, and/or the
higher the relative weight that governments attribute to their in￿ation object-
ive, ￿, the more the monetary union expansion is likely to increase taxes,
average in￿ation, output distortions and public expenditures.
Proof. See condition (17).
As explained above, through the ￿rst mechanism, the monetary union
enlargement diminishes the in￿ ationary impact of tax increases and thereby
ampli￿es their cost in terms of reduced output. This, in turn, encourages
governments to greater ￿scal discipline. However, when the central bank is
strongly populist (I small) and/or the governments slightly concerned about
output (relative to in￿ ation ￿i.e. ￿ large), this mechanism is weakened.
Consequently, the second mechanism due to uncertainty is more likely to
prevail, implying that the monetary union enlargement may translate into
less ￿scal moderation.
3.2 The asymmetric case
We now turn to the asymmetric case, where we allow for cross-country dif-
ferences in the targeted level of public expenditures as well as in the rel-
ative economic and political weights.15 These latter di⁄erences capture the
idea that smaller countries may have a political weight above their economic
weight (Ullrich 2004; Berger 2006). Moreover, we allow for di⁄erent de-
15More formally, this implies: ~ g1 6= ~ g2, s1 6= s2, z1 6= z2.
12grees of uncertainty in the member countries. In particular, we assume that
￿2
2 > ￿2
1. Hence, even if on average new members have similar preferences
to older members (I2 = I1 = I), there might be greater variance around
the expected value of their preferences. As a consequence, the entry of new
members into the MU increases uncertainty in the current member countries
(for all z2 > 0). This presumption seems realistic at least for an initial period
where the public and, in particular, the current members￿government need
some time to assess the preferences of the larger central bank.16 Further-
more, in this case, it is obvious that the additional uncertainty created by
the newcomers positively depends on their voting power in the CCB￿ s council
(represented by z2).
However, the assumption that ￿2
2 > ￿2
1 at the same time implies that the
MU extension will reduce uncertainty in the new member countries. This
idea could be justi￿ed by the fact that, during a transitional period, the
candidates for an entry into the MU experience some extra uncertainty due
to their adjustment to the new monetary regime which is resolved upon
entry. Another interpretation would be that the well established central
bank of the MU ￿for instance, the ECB ￿may be more predictable than
the entering members￿national central bank with, for instance, frequently
changing governors.
Considering these asymmetries, we can study how the characteristics of
the new entering countries may a⁄ect the economic outcomes in the current
members of the MU and vice versa. Our observations are summarised as
follows.
Result 6. An increase in the public expenditures target in country j re-
duces the tax rate and output distortions in country i. The strength of this
spillover-e⁄ect is increasing in uncertainty ￿2
￿U.
Proof. From di⁄erentiating (13) with respect to ~ gj, we obtain:
@￿U
i
@ ~ gj < 0.



















The key idea is that an increase in the targeted level of public expendit-
ures in country j not only augments the expected value and the variability
of common in￿ ation but it also accrues the variability of output in country
i. These e⁄ects lead the government in country i to reduce its tax rate.17
16This also happened to the initial group of countries forming the European Monetary
Union (EMU). As shown by Goldberg and Klein (2005), the perception of the ECB￿ s
reaction parameter has changed over time suggesting that the markets re￿ned their view
of the ECB￿ s characteristics and objectives.
17Note that even if governments are not concerned about price stability (￿ = 0), the
13Furthermore, since uncertainty exacerbates the in￿ ation variability created
by an increase in country j￿ s public expenditures target, the strength of the
tax decreasing response in country i positively depends on ￿2
￿U.
Result 7. An increase in the uncertainty about the monetary preferences in
country j reduces the tax rate and output distortions in country i. The higher
is country j￿ s political weight, the stronger is this e⁄ect.
Proof. This result is demonstrated by di⁄erentiating ￿U
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Moreover, as can be seen from this expression, the derivative of ￿U
i with
respect to ￿2
j is decreasing in the political weight of country j, zj.
Greater uncertainty about the monetary preferences in country j aug-
ments the uncertainty in the whole MU and thereby favours ￿scal discipline
in country i as well. Furthermore, as the uncertainty created in the MU by
an increase in ￿2
j positively depends on country j￿ s voting power, so does the
strength of the disciplinary e⁄ect of ￿2
j on ￿U
i .
As for the symmetric case, we derive the e⁄ects of the monetary union
enlargement on macroeconomic performances. Here, we can study how these
e⁄ects vary across the current and new member countries, depending on their
public expenditures target, their economic and political weights as well as on
their degree of monetary uncertainty.
Comparison of the tax rate (13) with that observed in country i before
the MU extension leads to the following results.
Result 8. Country i may experience an increase in taxes and output dis-
tortions due to MU enlargement if its new partner is characterized by lower
monetary uncertainty.





(where superscript U refers
to the situation after the MU extension) is positive if the following condition
public expenditures target in country j would exert downward pressures on the tax rate in
country i. This is due to the fact that an increase in ~ gj creates monetary uncertainty and
thereby raises output variability in country i. To counteract this e⁄ect, the government
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2. Thus, from the second line of condition (18), it appears
that the condition under which the MU enlargement leads to higher taxes is







Hence, since we assumed that the new members in the MU are char-
acterized by higher monetary uncertainty than the older members, result 8
suggests that they may experience a deterioration of their ￿scal discipline
and thereby see their output distortions increase.
This result can be explained as follows. In the simple case without mon-
etary uncertainty and asymmetries, the MU (enlargement) favours ￿scal dis-
cipline as in Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998), provided the central bank is
su¢ ciently more in￿ ation averse than the governments (i.e. I > ￿).18 This
result however may be reversed if the assumptions of perfect central bank
transparency and symmetric countries are given up.
Indeed, it is possible to show that the countries characterized by a rel-
atively higher degree of monetary uncertainty may experience a further de-
terioration of ￿scal discipline. The intuition is straightforward. For these
countries, the larger central bank runs a less uncertain monetary policy than
the national central bank did and this induces their governments to raise
taxation.
This negative consequence for the new members of the larger MU, how-
ever, might be avoided by deliberately creating higher uncertainty in the
MU. This could be achieved by increasing their political weight in the larger




Result 9. Country i may experience an increase in taxes and output dis-
tortions due to the MU enlargement if its new partner has a relatively lower
public spending target.
Proof. It is easy to see from the third line of condition (18) that the greater
is the di⁄erence (~ gi ￿ ~ gj), the more the MU enlargement is likely to increase
taxes in country i.
18This disciplining e⁄ect of the MU extension corresponds to the ￿rst term in condition
(18).
15This result also suggests that monetary unions formed by countries with
asymmetric public spending targets are likely to see a further polarization of
their national ￿scal policies.
Indeed, for the countries with a high public spending target, the MU
extension implies that the central bank will no longer react as strongly as
it did due to the ￿scal moderation of their new partners. Hence, in￿ ation-
ary pressure (on average and in terms of variance) automatically declines,
encouraging the government in these countries to adopt a more aggressive
￿scal stance.
Moreover, as can be seen from condition (18), the strength of this e⁄ect
positively depends on the degree of uncertainty in the enlarged MU. The
higher is ￿2
￿U, the greater is the governments￿perception of the decline in
in￿ ation variability due to the ￿scal discipline of their new partners.
Thus, increased uncertainty with the MU enlargement does not necessar-
ily prove to be bene￿cial for countries with a high public spending target.
This observation somewhat quali￿es our preceding results about the desirab-
ility of less central bank transparency in the MU.
4 Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated that uncertainty about the monetary author-
ities relative preferences for output and in￿ ation stabilization has a system-
atic in￿ uence on the optimal ￿scal policies of governments. In particular,
we found, in line with the literature, that uncertainty can discipline policy
makers, thereby leading to lower taxes, average in￿ ation and output dis-
tortions. We extended this well known result by introducing the case of a
monetary union and allowing for asymmetries between member countries.
The larger a monetary union would be, the less governments would internal-
ize the disciplinary e⁄ect of uncertainty and thus pursue a more aggressive
tax policy. In the case of symmetric countries, it would thereby be an ap-
propriate response by the central bank to become less transparent in a larger
union.
By looking at asymmetries, we found that monetary union and the move
to a larger central bank may increase uncertainty for some countries but
lower it for others, depending on the behaviour of the national central bank
in comparison to what the common central bank does. Given this asymmetric
in￿ uence of monetary union on the degree of uncertainty in di⁄erent mem-
ber states, we could expect an increase of taxation (and thus lower output
distortions) in those countries where uncertainty is reduced. We thus have
a convergence in levels of taxation. Those countries where uncertainty is re-
duced increase taxation and vice versa. Applied to the European integration
process, this would mean that taxation in new member states would increase
while it would fall in older member states. This should have positive e⁄ects
in older states and negative one in the new states. To counter this negative
16in￿ uence an increase in the political weight of the countries characterized by
a high degree of uncertainty might be bene￿cial.
We do not argue, however, that such an increase in uncertainty is a sys-
tematically e¢ cient response to the potential tax-increasing e⁄ects of a larger
MU. Indeed, by considering cross-country asymmetries in the governments￿
objectives, we show that the MU enlargement may lead to higher taxation
in countries with a relatively high spending target as they take advantage
of their partners￿￿scal discipline. Higher uncertainty in the MU then even
strengthens this e⁄ect.
Finally, our analysis does not provide any clear-cut argument to the de-
bate about the desirability of central bank transparency. On the contrary,
it underlines the crucial implications of asymmetric ￿scal policies in the MU
for the appropriate choice of central bank transparency.
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